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IDAHO’S ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE—AN INEFFECTIVE, COSTLY, AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ERADICATION 
The fury of a demon instantly possessed me. I knew myself no longer. My 
original soul seemed at once to take its flight from my body. And a more 
than fiendish malevolence, gin nurtured, thrilled every fiber of my frame.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Late on a Sunday night in 1987, Robert Serravo returned home from work.2 
He sat in his kitchen and read from the Bible.3 Overcome with religious delusions, 
Serravo believed that God sent him on a mission to convert others to his religious 
ideals.4 To accomplish his mission, Serravo believed he needed to “establish a reli-
gious community by constructing a sports complex dedicated to God.”5 But he felt 
his wife did not support his mission, and he believed that God wanted him to kill 
her “to prevent her from being an obstacle in his way.”6 After reading the Bible, 
                                                          
 1. EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Black Cat, in TALES OF EDGAR ALLEN POE 22, 25 (1965). 
 2. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo. 1992). 
 3. Id. 
 4. People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990). 
 5. Margaret E. Clark, The Immutable Command Meets the Unknowable Mind: Deific Decree 
Claims and the Insanity Defense after People v. Serravo, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 161, 175 (1992). 
 6. Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782. 
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Serravo went upstairs to his bedroom where his wife was asleep.7 He stood over 
her for a few minutes, and then he stabbed his sleeping wife in the back with a 
knife.8 The stab wound was not fatal and his wife woke up.9 Because she survived, 
Serravo believed she had passed a “divine test” and “would no longer be uncooper-
ative” with his mission.10 Serravo then told his wife that an intruder stabbed her.11 
Encouraging her to wait in bed, he went downstairs to call for medical assistance.12 
When the police arrived, Serravo told them that he was downstairs reading the Bi-
ble when he heard the front door slam shut.13 Serravo claimed he went upstairs to 
check on his wife when he saw her bleeding in bed.14 
Weeks later, Serravo’s wife found letters he wrote, in which he confessed to 
stabbing her.15 The letters read, “I have gone to be with Jehovah in heaven for three 
and one-half days,” and “I must return for there is still a great deal of work to be 
done.”16 When Serravo’s wife confronted him, he told her that God commanded 
him to stab her.17 Serravo’s wife informed the police of the letters and Serravo’s 
confession, and he was arrested and charged with attempted murder.18 
Because Colorado has an insanity defense statute,19 Serravo pled insanity as a 
defense to his crime.20 Colorado articulates the insanity defense standard as, “A 
person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the 
act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act is 
not accountable.”21 At trial, the court instructed the jury that the phrase “incapable 
of distinguishing right from wrong” refers to a person who understands that his 
conduct is criminal but, as a result of a mental disease or defect, believes that con-
duct is morally right.22 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insani-
ty.23 The Supreme Court of Colorado approved the verdict, noting that “a defendant 
may be judged legally insane where, as here, the defendant’s cognitive ability to 
distinguish right from wrong with respect to an act charged as a crime has been 
destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has ordered him to commit 
the act.”24 Because Serravo suffered from such psychotic delusions in which he 
believed that God commanded him to murder his wife, the court affirmed Serravo’s 
                                                          
 7. Id. 
 8. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 130. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782. 
 11. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 130. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 130–31. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 131. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 131. 
 18. Id. 
 19. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-103 (West 2014). 
 20. People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990). 
 21. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-101 (West 2014). 
 22. Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782. 
 23. Id. 
 24. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo. 1992). 
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acquittal under the insanity defense.25 And pursuant to Colorado’s insanity defense 
statute, the court committed Serravo to a state hospital for treatment.26 
Fast-forward fifteen years later, to June 29, 2002. John Cope was watching 
TV in his Lewiston, Idaho, apartment.27 His landlord, Brian Elliot, knocked on the 
door to remind Cope that he had three days to move out.28 Cope initially refused to 
answer the door.29 But when Elliot came back seconds later and again knocked, 
Cope believed he heard God command him, “finish him off he’s the mark of the 
beast. Get your knife and answer the door.”30 Cope opened the door.31 Because he 
thought “[Elliot] was the mark of the beast,” Cope murdered Elliot.32 He slit El-
liot’s neck and then mutilated the severed head.33 Upon cutting his own hand dur-
ing the murder, Cope went to the hospital covered in blood, acting “psychotic,” and 
rambling on about “letting the beast out.”34 Cope told the police that he was “‘being 
tormented by the mark of the beast’ and when the ‘mark of the beast’ came to his 
door, he cut the beast’s head off with a knife.”35 
The state charged Cope with first-degree murder.36 He was initially found un-
fit to proceed with trial, but four months later the court determined that he was 
competent to proceed.37 At trial, expert witnesses testified as to Cope’s mental 
health problems.38 Prior to the murder charge, Cope was involuntarily committed 
on three separate occasions in Idaho.39 Even when he was released, Cope was non-
compliant with his outpatient treatment, which made his mental health further dete-
riorate and caused him to be aggressive and violent.40 In addition, he was homeless, 
suffered from alcoholism, and lacked a support system.41 The trial judge noted, “I 
am concerned, I have to be concerned about the fact that there does not seem to be 
any kind of outpatient setting that can handle your state of mental illness.”42 And 
yet, despite the seriousness of Cope’s condition, Idaho’s ban on the insanity de-
fense precluded Cope from pleading insanity in hopes of receiving necessary treat-
ment.43 While the trial judge recognized Cope’s serious mental health problems, he 
also understood that releasing Cope back into society, untreated, would pose a 
threat to himself and to his community.44 With nowhere else to send Cope, the trial 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 132. 
 26. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 2014) (“If the trier of fact finds the defend-
ant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the department of 
human services until such time as he is found eligible for release.”). 
 27. State v. Cope, 129 P.3d 1241, 1243, 142 Idaho 492, 494 (2006). 
 28. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 29. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 30. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 31. See Cope, 129 P.3d at 1243, 142 Idaho at 494. 
 32. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 33. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 34. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 35. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 36. Id., 142 Idaho at 494. 
 37. Cope, 129 P.3d at 1244, 142 Idaho at 495. 
 38. Id. at 1249–51, 142 Idaho at 500–02. 
 39. Id. at 1250, 142 Idaho at 501. 
 40. Id., 142 Idaho at 501. 
 41. Id., 142 Idaho at 501. 
 42. Id., 142 Idaho at 501. 
 43. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2004). 
 44. Cope, 129 P.3d at 1251, 142 Idaho at 502. 
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judge sent him to prison.45 Aware of the need to protect society, the trial judge 
sentenced Cope to a fixed life sentence.46 But an insanity defense would have ena-
bled the judge to send Cope to a state mental hospital.47 
What is the difference between Robert Serravo and John Cope? Both men 
heard voices from God, commanding them to kill their victims, and both men acted 
on those commands.48 Both men took similar actions based on similar states of 
mind. But while their states of mind were similar, their states of residence were 
different —and the difference mattered: Serravo went away to be rehabilitated, 
while Cope, perhaps the more delusional of the two, went to prison to be pun-
ished.49 Because Idaho abolished the insanity defense, a sick man sits in an over-
burdened, underprepared prison instead of in a hospital suited to treat him, costing 
Idaho money and security in the process.50 This Article suggests that is the wrong 
approach. 
Idaho must repeal its ban on the insanity defense. The insanity defense is re-
quired under due process of the law, it promotes justice because it advances the 
goals of punishment, and it effectively rehabilitates mentally insane criminal de-
fendants and lowers recidivism rates, thereby saving money.51 Part II of this Article 
describes the origins and transformation of the insanity defense throughout ancient 
history and also explores the modern concepts of the insanity defense. Part III fo-
cuses on various challenges to the abolition of the insanity defense, specifically in 
Washington, Nevada, Mississippi, Arizona, and, most relevant to this Article, Ida-
ho. Part IV describes the goals of punishment in relation to mentally insane crimi-
nals, in an effort to demonstrate that the insanity defense advances the goals of pun-
ishment, whereas the lack of an insanity defense actually impedes the accomplish-
ment of these goals. Part V explains that mens rea, which is the “state of mind that 
the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when 
committing a crime,” has two components.52 These two components are intent and 
moral blameworthiness, one of which has been abandoned in some states, including 
Idaho.53 Part V also argues that said elimination has been justified by an argument 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 1251, 142 Idaho at 502. 
 46. Id. at 1232, 142 Idaho at 494. 
 47. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 2014) (“If the trier of fact finds the 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the de-
partment of human services until such time as he is found eligible for release.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
15A-1321 (West 2014) (a “defendant [who] has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a crime” will 
be committed to a “Forensic Unit operated by the Department of Health and Human Services . . .”); Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–64 (1983) (holding that a finding of insanity at trial is “sufficiently proba-
tive of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment” to a mental hospital); United States v. 
Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant who was convicted of murder and rape was sent to a 
psychiatric hospital because he was mentally insane). 
 48. Compare People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990), with Cope, 129 P.3d at 
1243, 142 Idaho at 494. 
 49. Compare People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 132 (Colo. 1992), with Cope, 129 P.3d at 1251, 
142 Idaho at 502. 
 50. See infra Part VI. 
 51. See generally Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of 
the Constitutional Implications of “Abolishing” the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1541 
(2002) (stating that “one can only arrive at the conclusion that due process prohibits the elimination of the 
extrinsic insanity defense.”). 
 52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009). 
 53. See infra Part V. 
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that a single-prong interpretation of mens rea is sufficient to stand in for an insanity 
defense, but in fact such an interpretation constitutes a violation of due process 
rights. Finally, Part VI illustrates how adopting an insanity defense will save Idaho 
money in the long run. The goal of this Article is to portray the need for an insanity 
defense in order to comply with the fundamental principles of the law and to effec-
tively rehabilitate in order to treat those who need to be treated, such as John Cope, 
and to subsequently reduce crime and save money in Idaho. 
II. HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
A. Ancient History 
The origins of the insanity defense trace back to second century Jewish law.54 
The Talmud, a collection of Jewish codes dating back to biblical times, reads, “It is 
an ill thing to knock against a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor. He that wounds 
them is culpable, but if they wound others they are not culpable . . . for with them 
only the act is a consequence while the intention is of no consequence.”55 While 
imbeciles, as we know them today, are not necessarily mentally insane, the ancient 
Talmud reflects an attempt to relate criminal culpability to one’s state of mind and 
mental faculties.56 Specifically, the Talmud distinguished between a criminal de-
fendant of sound mind, who is legally responsible for his actions, and a criminal 
defendant of a lower mental capacity, an “imbecile,” who is not legally responsible 
for his actions.57 Thus, while defendants who harmed those with a diminished men-
tal capacity were held morally blameworthy and legally responsible, defendants 
with a diminished mental capacity were precluded from moral blameworthiness 
and, subsequently, legal responsibility.58 
Traces of legal codes that established insanity defenses and distinguished 
mentally insane defendants from sane defendants are also found in Ancient Roman 
history.59 For instance, the Justinian Code in the sixth century declared mentally 
insane criminals unaccountable due to their illnesses.60 The Digest of Justinian 
reads, “An infant or a madman who kills a man [i]s not liable . . . [he is] excused by 
the misfortune of his condition.”61 Because the mentally insane lacked the overt 
intention to commit wrongdoings, such individuals were incapable of producing 
wrongdoings under the Justinian Code.62 
                                                          
 54. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 10 (1988). 
 55. Id.; Marvin H. Firestone, Psychiatric Patients and Forensic Psychiatry, in LEGAL MED. 621 
(Am. Coll. of Leg. Med. ed., 7th ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.ablminc.org/Model_Curriculum_LMME_2010/BOOK_Legal%20Medicine-7th_2007/Ch67-
Psychiatric%20Patients%20and%20Forensic%20Psychiatry.pdf. 
 56. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BABA KAMMA 50102 (Isidore Epstein ed., 1935), availa-
ble at http://halakhah.com/babakamma/babakamma_87.html#87a_14. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, BOOK 48, 8: Lex Cornelia on Murders and Prisoners, 12: 
Modestinus (Paul Kreuger et al. eds., 1985). 
 62. Id.; SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10. 
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Anglo-Saxon law further developed the insanity defense.63 In the fourteenth 
century, King Edward III of England recognized insanity as a complete defense to 
crimes.64 In fact, the earliest record of an English jury acquitting a defendant due to 
insanity dates back to 1505.65 And by 1581, the insanity defense was well estab-
lished in English common law.66 That year, William Lambarde, an English legal 
writer and scholar, wrote, “[i]f a madman or natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of 
his lunacy do [kill a man], this is no felonious act for they cannot be said to have 
any understanding will.” 67  Thus, English common law maintained that without 
“any understanding will,” such as a specific intention to harm at the time of the 
wrongdoing, no accountability rested upon the insane defendant.68 
In 1723, an English court in Rex v. Arnold applied the “wild beast test,” hold-
ing that an insane defendant could only use the insanity defense if he was “totally 
deprived of his understanding and memory so as to not know what he is doing, no 
more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast.”69 Simply put, the “wild beast test” 
required a defendant lack any sense of reasoning power,70 so that the defendant had 
acted less, if at all, like a human and more similar to a beast, which almost com-
pletely lacks mental faculties. The wild beast test remained the insanity defense 
standard for more than a century.71 
In an attempt to leave the wild beast test behind, shifting focus more towards 
morality, an English judge presiding over a murder case in 1812 held that “distinct 
and unquestioned evidence” must demonstrate that the defendant was unable to 
distinguish between right and wrong.72 But the “right and wrong” test proved diffi-
cult to apply to mentally insane criminal defendants, since even knowledge that an 
act is wrong does not necessarily mean the defendant is culpable.73 
Such standards were abandoned over time, largely due to difficulties in apply-
ing the different rules and disagreements over the meaning of terms and phrases.74 
But an English case, Queen v. M’Naghten,75 left its mark in the history of the insan-
ity defense that still influences criminal jurisprudence today.76 
                                                          
 63. See SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley: A Brief History of the Insanity Defense, PBS 
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/history.html (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014) [hereinafter From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Rex v. Arnold, (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (Eng.); SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 
1011 n.16. 
 70. Christopher Hawthorne,”Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1793 (2000). 
 71. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 998–99 (2001); Norman J. Finkel et al., Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors’ Per-
spective, 9 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 77 (1985).  
 72. EDWIN MAXEY, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES 21 (1915). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n & American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law as 
Amici Curiae inSuppor of Petitioner, Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012) (No. 11-1515), 2012 WL 
2930901, at *5–6 [hereinafter Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n]. 
 75. Queen v. M’Naghten, [1843] 2 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.); 10 Clark & F. 200. 
 76. J.C. Oleson, Is Tyler Durden Insane?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 579, 605 (2007). The following states 
have adopted the rule from M’Naghten, or a modification of the M’Naghten rule, as the insanity defense 
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B. Modern History 
1. The M’Naghten Test 
In the highly influential 1843 M’Naghten case, a jury found the defendant, a 
paranoid schizophrenic who was charged with murder, not guilty on grounds of 
insanity.77 The defendant, Daniel M’Naghten, believed, due to his paranoid schizo-
phrenia, that the Prime Minister of England, Sir Robert Peel, was persecuting him 
and attempting to murder him.78 M’Naghten sought help from the police, but the 
police rejected his requests for protection.79 Thus, M’Naghten, believing he had no 
other resort, took matters into his own hands and attempted to assassinate Sir Rob-
ert Peel.80 But M’Naghten mistook Sir Robert Peel’s secretary, Edward Drum-
mond, for his actual target.81 And with premeditation and intention, M’Naghten 
shot and killed Drummond.82 
At trial, the House of Lords instructed the jury, “[i]f the prisoner was not sen-
sible at the time he committed the act, that it was a violation of the law of God or of 
man, undoubtedly he was not responsible for that act or liable to any punishment 
flowing from that act.”83 Somewhat creating a hybrid of the wild beast test and the 
right and wrong test, each of which proved inadequate on its own, the House of 
Lords held that “persons [lacked] criminal capacity if they did not know what they 
were doing or were unable to distinguish between right and wrong, even if their 
mental derangement fell a little short of total deprivation of mind and memory.”84 
Thus, under the M’Naghten test, the defendant must have either not known the “na-
ture and quality of [what] he was doing” or, if he knew the nature and quality of 
what he was doing, he was unaware of the wrongfulness of his crime.85 The jury 
                                                                                                                                       
standard: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (2014); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 
(2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 2014); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 16-8-101.5 (2014); FLA. STAT. § 775.027 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (2014); IOWA CODE § 
701.4 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 552-030 
(2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 
(West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (West 
2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-5-10, 22-1-2 (2014); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2014); In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340, 1347 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978); White v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 353, 356–57 (Va. 2006); see also Laney v. 
State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986). 
 77. M’Naghten, 2 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Clark & F.200; Oleson, supra note 76, at 603–05; SIMON & 
AARONSON, supra note 54, at 12. 
 78. Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Crim-
inal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 15 (2007); Jenny Williams, Reduction 
in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: Kansas Upholds the Replacement of the 
M’Naughten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense, 44 
WASHBURN L.J. 213, 218 (2004). 
 79. Williams, supra note 78, at 218. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 12. 
 83. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 13; Queen v. M’Naghten, [1843] 2 Eng. Rep. 718 
(H.L.); 10 Clark & F. 200. 
 84. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 14; M’Naghten, 2 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Clark & F.200. 
 85. Judith A. Morse & Gregory K. Thoreson, Criminal Law – United States v. Lyons: Abolish-
ing the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177, 179 (1984). 
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had to find the defendant not guilty on grounds of insanity if the jury found that 
the defendant either did not know the nature and quality of what he did, or did not 
know that what he did was wrong.86 So, unlike the wild beast test, the M’Naghten 
test held that the defendant need not suffer from a total departure of the mind.87 
Because the jury was persuaded by testimony that M’Naghten suffered from 
delusions that impaired his ability to know the nature and quality of what he was 
doing, and because the jury believed that M’Naghten’s paranoid schizophrenia pre-
vented him from distinguishing right from wrong, the jury acquitted M’Naghten.88 
The court subsequently committed M’Naghten to an asylum, where he spent the 
rest of his life.89 
By 1851, courts all over the United States adopted the M’Naghten rule as an 
insanity defense standard that functioned as an affirmative defense to the crime 
charged.90 In fact, in 1946, the United States Supreme Court first upheld the Court 
of Appeals’ application of the M’Naghten standard in Fisher v. United States.91 For 
over 100 years, until the mid-1990’s, the United States judicial systems and legisla-
tures used the M’Naghten rule to exonerate mentally insane criminal defendants.92 
During that time, only one state, New Hampshire, departed from the M’Naghten 
rule.93 
2. The Durham Test 
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia modified the 
M’Naghten rule and adopted what became known as the “product rule.” 94  In 
Durham v. United States, the Court held “an accused is not criminally responsible 
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”95 In effect, 
the Court in Durham adopted a rule favorable to mentally insane criminals because 
it rendered mental diseases and defects as justifications for criminal acts, thus 
avoiding criminal responsibility.96 Moving away from the moral right versus wrong 
implications in the M’Naghten standard, the Durham rule applied science to formu-
late an insanity defense standard.97 But the rule was not widely accepted outside the 
psychiatry world.98 Because the test opened up the doors for any defendant with 
any kind of mental disease or defect to plead insanity, many critics of the Durham 
                                                          
 86. Oleson, supra note 76, at 605. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Fradella, supra note 78, at 16. 
 89. Id. 
 90. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 14. 
 91. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946). The jury was instructed, “[i]nsanity, ac-
cording to the criminal law, is a disease or defect of the mind which renders one incapable to understand the 
nature and quality of his act, to know that it is wrong, to refrain from doing the wrongful act.” Id. at 467 n.3. 
 92. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67. 
 93. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 94. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Brawner, 
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 95. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874–75. 
 96. See id. 
 97. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67. 
 98. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 52. 
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rule were concerned that the rule would lead to acquittals of defendants who need-
ed to be held accountable.99 
3. The Model Penal Code Test 
Less than a decade later, in response to the debates over an adequate insanity 
defense standard, the American Law Institute (ALI) formulated a model insanity 
test.100 The test, articulated in Model Penal Code § 4.01 and created in 1962, states, 
[A] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.101 
In effect, similar to the Durham test, the ALI test incorporates scientific evidence to 
determine whether an alleged mentally insane criminal defendant should be held 
responsible for his crime.102 But unlike the Durham test, the Model Penal Code test 
does not apply to defendants “whose mental illness or defect only manifests itself 
in criminal or antisocial conduct.”103 In effect, the Model Penal Code test excludes 
defendants who only exhibited their mentally insane symptoms through criminal 
acts.104 Such mentally insane symptoms had to have been exhibited through various 
aspects of the defendants’ lives,105 not only through their criminal conduct. Thus, 
this test limits the number of defendants held unaccountable due to the insanity 
defense. Deemed the most “influential and widely used” insanity test in the United 
States, “half of the states and the federal courts” adopted the Model Penal Code 
test.106 
4. The Brawner Test 
The Supreme Court adopted a variation of the Model Penal Code test when it 
overruled Durham in 1972.107 Finding the Durham insanity defense test impractical 
and difficult to carry out,108 the Court in United States v. Brawner adopted a hybrid 
rule.109 Brawner first incorporated a definition articulated in McDonald v. United 
States, a 1962 case that defined a mental disease or defect as “any abnormal condi-
tion of the mind which substantially affects [mental] or emotional processes and 
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substantially impairs behavior controls.” 110  Next, Brawner adopted the Model 
Penal Code insanity defense standard.111 Thus, the Brawner insanity defense rule is 
two-fold.112 First, the Court defines a mental disease or defect according to the 
McDonald definition.113 The second component of the test derives from Model 
Penal Code § 4.01, which, as previously discussed, excuses a mentally insane de-
fendant from criminal responsibility if the defendant, at the time of the crime and 
due to his mental illness, either “(i) lacks substantial capacity to appreciate that his 
conduct is wrongful, or (ii) lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
law.”114 The Brawner test was formulated in an effort to be narrow and strict,115 
unlike the Durham test, which, when applied, resulted in an increased number of 
insanity defense acquittees.116 
5. The Hinckley Effect 
Insanity defense jurisprudence dramatically changed in 1982 after John W. 
Hinckley Jr.’s trial, which resulted in a controversial application of the Brawner 
insanity defense standard.117 In an effort to impress actress Jodi Foster, Hinckley 
attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.118 At Hinckley’s trial, the D.C. 
court applied the Brawner test and the prosecution carried the burden to prove, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that Hinckley was sane.119 But evidence presented at trial 
suggested that Hinckley suffered from schizophrenia.120 Because the prosecution 
was unable to rebut the insanity claim with evidence of Hinckley’s sanity, the jury 
concluded the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof. 121  Subsequently, 
Hinckley was found “not guilty” by reason of insanity on all counts.122 
Hinckley’s acquittal produced outrage across the nation.123 The public felt the 
“president’s attacker was being ‘let off.’”124 Such outraged sparked a debate on the 
reformation, and even the abolition, of the insanity defense.125 A law professor stat-
ed, 
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The great irony is that [Hinckley] was in some ways the poster boy for the 
insanity defense. He was insane. But people wanted revenge. They wanted 
him held accountable. They were angry. And they couldn’t take out that 
anger on John Hinckley. So instead they took it out on the criminal 
code.126 
Indeed, prior to the Hinckley trial, all fifty states and the federal government admin-
istered some formation of an insanity defense.127 But since the Hinckley trial, thirty-
six states have reformed their insanity defense laws, and four of these states even 
completely abolished the insanity defense.128 Idaho, the state most relevant to this 
article, repealed its insanity defense statute in 1982,129 just months after the contro-
versial Hinckley verdict.130 In each of the four states that abolished the insanity de-
fense, evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible to rebut and negate the 
mental element (the intent) of the offense charged.131 Thus, instead of implement-
ing an insanity defense, these states have a “Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule” that 
permits evidence of mental insanity only in reference to the required intent of the 
offense charged.132 But such evidence is otherwise prohibited, and no affirmative 
defense exists regarding mental insanity.133 
The federal government responded to the aftermath of Hinckley’s trial by 
codifying the insanity defense in an attempt to compromise between those who 
wanted the insanity defense abolished and psychiatric and legal professionals who 
argued merely for a modification of the insanity defense.134 The Insanity Defense 
Reform Act of 1984 abandoned the Model Penal Code insanity defense standard.135 
The act called for strict qualifications in an effort to “[limit] the scope of insanity 
acquittals.”136 In order to use the insanity defense, under the act, a defendant must 
“show that his mental disease or defect is ‘severe.’”137 Further, a defendant must 
show that, as a result of his “severe” mental disease or defect, “[he] was unable to 
appreciate the nature and quality or the criminality or wrongfulness of his acts.”138 
The law shifted the burden of proof from the prosecutor onto the defendant in order 
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to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was “legally insane at the 
time of the crime.”139 Combining elements of two previous insanity defense tests, 
Congress adopted the “nature and quality” language from the M’Naghten test and 
incorporated the term “appreciate” from the Model Penal Code test. 140 Further, 
Congress used the “wrongfulness” element of the Model Penal Code test to “de-
scribe the types of appreciation in question.”141 Thus, the law essentially returned to 
the historic “right/wrong” test.142 If the defendant met his burden of proof in estab-
lishing the affirmative defense, the Act created a “special verdict” of “not guilty by 
reason of insanity,” similar to the verdict reached in the Hinckley trial.143 But such 
a verdict was more difficult to obtain, being that the burden, under this act, rested 
upon the defendant.144 
Courts around the country began to embrace the Insanity Defense Reform 
Act, adding some modifications and clarifications.145 While many states have modi-
fied their insanity defense tests, few states have continued to avoid readopting the 
defense.146 But such abolitions have produced constitutional challenges across the 
court system.147 Some challenges have been successful,148 while others have not.149 
III. CHALLENGES TO THE ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
A. The United States Beyond Idaho 
In some states that previously abolished the insanity defense, the courts have 
overturned such abolitions, holding that due process of the law requires some kind 
of formation of an insanity defense.150 Thus, these states now have the insanity de-
fense, as required under either the federal Constitution, various state Constitutions, 
or, in some cases, both.151 
For instance, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that a defendant is 
denied state constitutional guarantees when he is precluded from consideration of 
his insanity at the time he committed the charged offense.152 In fact, in 1910, the 
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Supreme Court of Washington was the first court to declare the abolition of the 
insanity defense unconstitutional.153 In that case, State v. Strasburg, the court first 
recognized that the Washington State Constitution prohibits the deprivation of any 
person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”154 Next, the court 
ruled that the issue of insanity is “inherently related to the guilt or innocence” of a 
criminal defendant.155 Finally, the Court emphasized that even in common law, 
criminal intent was an “essential element in every crime.”156 And therefore, in re-
fusing to consider evidence of mental insanity in determining whether criminal 
intent exists and in refusing the defendant an opportunity to put forth such evidence 
to negate criminal intent, the court in Strasburg declared Washington’s ban on the 
insanity defense a violation of due process.157 
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court used both the due process clause of the 
Nevada Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
to conclude that Nevada’s abolition of the insanity defense was unconstitutional.158 
While recognizing that neither the state nor federal Constitution expressly requires 
the insanity defense, the court in Finger v. State found that “both Constitutions 
prohibit an individual from being convicted of a criminal offense without pos-
sessing the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime.”159 The court stated that 
its reasoning was based upon history.160 Specifically, the court held that the history 
of American law demonstrates the fundamental and deeply rooted principle of 
criminal law that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime if he lacks understand-
ing of his actions and the requisite criminal intent.161 While the court did not further 
delve into the history of American law, it likely referred to the various insanity de-
fense tests that have gone through the American courts and legislatures throughout 
the years. Indeed, the court emphasized that “Congress, even in the face of the pub-
lic outrage following the Hinckley trial, refused to completely abolish the concept 
of legal insanity, recognizing that culpability is a prerequisite to a criminal prosecu-
tion.”162 In sum, the court in Finger, similar to the court in Strasburg, concluded 
that due process requires the opportunity for a criminal defendant to present evi-
dence of his insanity in order to demonstrate that he lacked the required criminal 
intent for the crime charged.163 
Finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Sinclair v. State, determined that a 
statute maintaining insanity was not a defense to the crime of murder was unconsti-
tutional because it violated state due process.164 The concurring opinion relied on 
history to argue that the insanity defense has been and is afforded constitutional 
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protection.165 “So closely has the idea of insanity as a defense to crime been wo-
ven into the criminal jurisprudence of English-speaking countries that it has be-
come a part of the fundamental laws thereof, to the extent that a statute that at-
tempts to deprive a defendant of the right to plead it will be unconstitutional and 
void.”166 Thus, similar to the court in Finger, the court in Sinclair based its argu-
ment on the history of American law regarding mentally insane defendants.167 But 
the court did not solely rely on history.168 Indeed, the court further proclaimed, “it 
is certainly shocking and inhuman to punish a person for an act when he does not 
have the capacity to know the act or to judge of its consequences.”169 And so, draw-
ing on morality, Sinclair confirms the historic principle that criminal defendants 
who do not understand their actions or the consequences of their actions should not 
be held criminally responsible. 
On the other side, the United States Supreme Court recently affirmed Arizo-
na’s limited use of the insanity defense.170 In Clark v. Arizona, the Court held that 
Arizona’s narrow definition of insanity is constitutional.171 Arizona incorporates 
the M’Naghten standard into its insanity defense statute, but it eliminated one com-
ponent of the M’Naghten standard, cognitive incapacity.172 The cognitive incapaci-
ty prong asks whether a defendant, due to a mental defect, was prevented from un-
derstanding what he was doing when he committed the charged offense.173 Thus, 
with the elimination of the cognitive capacity prong, Arizona only permitted evi-
dence of mental insanity to disprove moral incapacity, so a defendant could only 
obtain a “guilty but mentally insane” verdict if he proved he did not know his crim-
inal act was wrong.174 In sum, mental insanity, under Arizona’s statute, could not 
be used to negate mens rea. The Court found the narrowed insanity defense statute 
did not violate due process because the M’Naghten standard “did not rise to the 
level of a fundamental right.”175 But the Court refused to determine whether the 
insanity defense itself is protected by the Constitution.176 
B. Idaho 
Today, four states prohibit the insanity defense, including Idaho.177 Years ago, 
Idaho had an insanity defense written into law.178 The Idaho Supreme Court adopt-
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ed the 1962 ALI Model Penal Code test,179 as previously discussed in Part II. How-
ever, shortly after the Hinckley trial, in response to public concern and following 
many states’ lead, the Idaho legislature reconsidered its adoption of the insanity 
defense.180 And in 1982, Idaho completely abolished the insanity defense.181 
The Idaho statute that prohibits the insanity defense reads, “Mental condition 
shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.”182 But the statute, I.C. § 
18-207, further indicates that evidence relating to the state of mind (mens rea) will 
not be prohibited, even if it relates to mental insanity.183 Thus, in Idaho, evidence of 
mental insanity is allowed in for the narrow purpose of demonstrating that the de-
fendant lacked the required criminal intent (i.e., mental element of the offense) for 
the crime charged.184 This is an example of a Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule, as 
previously discussed,185 that some states have adopted to replace the insanity de-
fense. 
In 1990, defendant Barryngton Eugene Searcy challenged Idaho’s ban on the 
insanity defense in I.C. § 18-207.186 Searcy argued that the unavailability of the 
insanity defense violates due process.187 But the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the 
statute.188 Holding that neither the Idaho Constitution nor the United States Consti-
tution expressly requires the insanity defense, the court found that Idaho did not 
deprive Searcy of his constitutional rights, specifically due process rights, when 
Idaho precluded him from using an insanity defense.189 The court reasoned that 
because I.C. § 18-207 does not prohibit evidence of mental illness if it relates to the 
required mens rea of the charged offense, the statute does not violate due pro-
cess.190 Because Searcy could offer evidence of mental insanity to negate the re-
quired mens rea of the offense, the court found he was afforded his due process 
rights — despite the fact he could not offer evidence of mental insanity as a sepa-
rate, affirmative defense to the crime.191 The existence of a mens rea doctrine in 
Idaho was enough for the court in Searcy to affirm the abolition of the insanity de-
fense.192 
But Searcy carries with it notable dissenting opinions. One justice, for in-
stance, noted that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense violates the Idaho Con-
stitution.193 He pointed to Idaho history, emphasizing that “[t]he insanity defense 
was well established in the Territory of Idaho at the time of the Idaho Constitution-
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al Convention and continued to be part of our jurisprudence until the legislature 
purposed to abolished it in 1982. It has been part of the process that was due de-
fendants in criminal cases for virtually the entire existence of our Idaho legal sys-
tem. It is fundamental to our jurisprudence and is protected by the due process 
clauses of art. 1, § 13.”194 In sum, according to this justice, because the insanity 
defense is rooted in Idaho history, it is a fundamental principle of criminal law and, 
therefore, an abolition of the insanity defense offends due process under the Idaho 
Constitution.195 
Another justice, in a separate dissent, stated that the abolition of the insanity 
defense violates the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.196 In response to the majority’s argument that due process is satisfied 
when a defendant has the opportunity to disprove criminal intent with evidence of 
mental insanity, this dissent noted that criminal blameworthiness goes beyond 
criminal intent, in relation to the required mens rea.197 In fact, the doctrine of mens 
rea relating solely to intent, as adopted by the court of Idaho, and the insanity de-
fense are two separate concerns.198 Rather, criminal blameworthiness “implies a 
certain quality of knowledge and intent transcending a minimal awareness and pur-
posefulness.”199 This dissent indicated that the insanity defense would be rendered 
useless if a mens rea doctrine focusing solely on criminal intent could substitute its 
place.200 Idaho’s mens rea doctrine, according to this justice, is only concerned with 
the culpability of the mind.201 But the insanity defense is concerned with “whether 
the guilty mind with which the act is done is a product of voluntary and rational 
choice.”202 Thus, a mens rea doctrine that addresses only intent and not moral 
blameworthiness is inadequate in providing due process to mentally insane criminal 
defendants.203 The separate and independent existence of the insanity defense, as 
demonstrated in history, is of “significance to entitle it to a place in our American 
concept of ‘ordered liberty.’”204 Because this dissent concluded that the abolition of 
the insanity defense violates the United States Due Process clause, it did not pro-
ceed to address the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution.205 
More recently, defendant John Joseph Delling challenged the constitutionality 
of I.C. § 18-207.206 In 2007, Delling was arrested for the murders of three young 
men.207 All three of the victims, his former friends, were shot – one in Boise, Idaho, 
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one in Moscow, Idaho, and one in Tucson, Arizona. 208 There is no doubt that 
Delling was mentally insane at the time of the crime.209 Indeed, one of the motivat-
ing factors for killing his victims was his belief that they were “stealing [his] pow-
ers,” he told his brother.210 In fact, Delling believed that the victims were trying to 
“destroy his brain.”211 His mother confirmed in an interview, “John was very sick, 
and that’s all I can tell you.”212 As indicated in the record before the district court, 
Delling, at the time of the murders, suffered from “severe paranoid schizophrenia, a 
mental illness that has, as one of its defining characteristics, delusions that affect an 
individual’s beliefs and understandings of what he is doing.”213 Testimony at trial 
revealed that Delling “truly believed, delusionally and tragically, that in order to 
save his own life, to keep him [from] being destroyed, he had to stop the people 
that he thought were harming him . . . He thought he was doing what he had to do 
in order to save himself.”214 Thus, Delling’s paranoid schizophrenia fostered delu-
sions that ultimately led Delling to kill his victims.215 
The state charged Delling with two counts of first-degree murder.216 A year 
after being declared unfit to proceed with trial, the district court found that 
Delling’s mental state had improved, and he was declared fit to stand trial.217 The 
trial judge recognized that Delling, at the time of the murders, was unable to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his criminal conduct.218 But the court convicted Delling 
of murder because he was unable to plea insanity under Idaho law.219 In effect, 
“[t]he state was saying that a man who was so insane that he could not understand 
that it was wrong to kill two of his friends was just as culpable as a sane person.”220 
Upon entering into a conditional plea of guilty to two counts of second-degree 
murder, in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of concurrent sentences, 
the court sentenced Delling to determinate life in prison.221 Delling appealed the 
judgment, challenging the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207.222 
But Delling lost on appeal.223 Similar to the majority opinion in Searcy, Jus-
tice Burdick on the Idaho Supreme Court held that because Idaho’s statute allows 
evidence of mental insanity to be considered if it relates to the required mens rea of 
the charged crime, the abolition of the insanity defense does not violate a criminal 
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defendant’s due process rights.224 Citing Searcy, Burdick emphasized, “[a]lthough 
no longer a separate defense, evidence of mental illness or disability is expressly 
permitted by statute to rebut state’s evidence offered to prove criminal intent or 
mens rea.” 225  Burdick further noted, “[i]n the absence of an insanity defense, 
Delling is still able to present a defense; it just takes a different form.”226 But Ida-
ho’s mens rea doctrine and the insanity defense produce dramatically different re-
sults for a mentally insane defendant, such as Delling, who had the specific intent 
to kill. The mens rea doctrine serves no helpful purpose for Delling and in fact in-
culpates Delling, whereas an insanity defense would exculpate Delling. 
Delling appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 2012, but the Court 
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.227 Justice Breyer, joined with Justice 
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, dissented.228 In his opinion, Justice Breyer gave 
two examples of mentally insane criminal defendants. 229 One of the defendants 
believed the victim was a wolf, and he shot and killed the victim, in fear of the per-
ceived wolf.230 The other defendant believed that a wolf ordered him to kill the 
human victim, so he shot and killed the human to comply with the wolf’s de-
mand.231 The first defendant, because he lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime 
of murder in that he lacked intent to kill a human, is not guilty.232 But the second 
defendant, even though mentally insane, would have no defense to the crime of 
murder, because he knew he killed a human and he had the requisite criminal intent 
to kill the human. 233 Under the current Idaho law, even though both defendants are 
mentally insane, the second defendant would be guilty.234 In Delling’s case, be-
cause he knew he was in fact killing human beings, even though he suffered from 
delusions that motivated his killings, he had the requisite mens rea and thus had no 
defense to his crimes under Idaho law.235 While Delling was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct, he had the criminal intent to kill humans.236 Thus, 
John Joseph Delling is currently in solitary confinement in Idaho’s Maximum Se-
curity Institution with a life sentence and no possibility of parole.237 
The American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry 
and the Law wrote an Amici Curiae brief in support of Delling.238 The brief first 
focused on history to argue that the abolition of the insanity defense is unconstitu-
tional.239 Pointing to Anglo-American history, the brief stressed the rich and deeply 
rooted tradition to avoid punishing mentally insane defendants when the crimes 
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result from an inability to logically understand the nature of one’s act.240 Noting the 
adoption of various insanity defense standards in American history, the brief stated, 
“From 1900 through the 1950’s, the M’Naghten standard governed in most juris-
dictions, while about one-third of the States added [another variation of the insanity 
defense]” and “[by] the early 1980’s the ALI formulation, or some close variant, 
governed in the federal courts and in ‘a majority of the country’s jurisdictions.’ ”241 
The brief then reached deeper into history, noting the ancient criminal principle that 
at least some level of understanding is a prerequisite for culpability.242 Pointing to 
English common law, the brief quoted Sir William Blackstone, who explained that 
an act of will is required for criminal culpability.243 But, according to Blackstone, a 
defect or lack of will may arise “in an idiot or a lunatic,” and therefore such indi-
viduals are “not chargeable for their acts, if committed when under these capaci-
ties.” 244 
The Amici Curiae brief then argued that due to the consensus among the 
states to adopt and implement some form of an insanity defense, the insanity de-
fense is a fundamental principle of justice.245 In fact, an overwhelming majority of 
forty-six states have an insanity defense, and the Court has held that a consensus 
among the states is “persuasive evidence” that a “practice is indeed a fundamental 
principle of justice.”246 And if both history and the vast majority of the states em-
brace that principle of justice, the principle is, in fact, fundamental.247 The United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause is violated if 
an act or a failure to act, such as the failure to incorporate the insanity defense, “of-
fends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”248 Prior to Delling, the Idaho Supreme 
Court addressed this due process argument in State v. Searcy,249 as previously dis-
cussed. But the court used the lack of a uniform insanity defense standard to rebut 
the argument that the insanity defense has a deep, important history in America and 
in Idaho.250 The court held, 
The insanity defense has had a long and varied history during its develop-
ment in the common law. As the understanding of the mental processes 
changed over the centuries, the implications of a criminal defendant’s in-
sanity have changed. . . . Not surprisingly, there has resulted a wide dis-
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parity in the positions taken on this issue both by legislatures and courts in 
the various states.251 
However, the court in Searcy failed to appreciate the basic notion and common, 
historical understanding that a defendant who lacks a rational understanding of his 
actions is precluded from criminal culpability. While insanity defense standards 
have varied throughout the years, the mere fact that the insanity defense lives on in 
the vast majority of the states reflects its fundamental nature and appropriate place 
in American law. 
IV. THE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT 
The Amici Curiae brief further argued that the lack of an insanity defense 
does not promote the goals of punishment.252 There are four primary goals of pun-
ishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.253 Idaho’s ban 
on the insanity defense fails to advance any of them. 
A. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation, the first goal of punishment, aims to prevent recidivism, which 
is the return to criminal activity after incapacitation.254 In order to prevent recidi-
vism, prison rehabilitation programs help offenders transition back into society as 
law-abiding citizens.255 But prison rehabilitation programs do not adequately assist 
mentally insane offenders, who require specialized treatment and therapy. 256 In-
stead of prioritizing rehabilitation, prisons focus primarily on security.257 The exec-
utive director of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law stated, “Gener-
ally speaking, correctional institutions are not well equipped to deal with the men-
tally ill.”258 Rather, such offenders would be more effectively rehabilitated in psy-
chiatric institutions.259 Even the chief psychologist for the Idaho Department of 
Correction, confirmed that, “people with severe mental illness are better treated 
outside the prison setting, if possible.”260 But mentally insane criminals, if unable 
to use the insanity defense because the state they are in has abolished the insanity 
defense, will not go to a psychiatric institution upon conviction.261 Instead, mental-
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ly insane criminals are forced to use the inadequate prison rehabilitation programs 
while serving their sentences.262 Ultimately, such criminals are unlikely to be reha-
bilitated and more likely to return to prison upon release.263 
B. Retribution 
According to the second theory, retribution, the goal of punishment is to im-
pose a suffering on the offender proportional to the harm that his crime caused.264 
Retribution is a backward-looking theory that justifies punishment because crime is 
morally wrong and criminals must be held accountable for their wrongdoings.265 
While some critics of retribution view the theory as a revenge-seeking goal of pun-
ishment, retribution actually seeks to punish primarily because criminals deserve 
punishment.266 Retribution does not seek to punish criminals because society wants 
them to be punished and society craves revenge–it seeks to punish because the in-
dividual criminal deserves punishment for his actions.267 But mentally insane crim-
inals do not deserve a punishment proportional to their crimes. Retribution only 
serves the interests of culpable criminal defendants who act with free will.268 Be-
cause mentally insane criminals, by definition, lack free will over their actions at 
the time of their crimes, they are inculpable.269 Indeed, their actions are a result of 
their mental illness, rather than their “controllable conscious choice.”270 Thus, pun-
ishing such individuals in proportion to their crimes does not advance the goal of 
retribution. Instead, mentally insane criminals should receive lesser sentences re-
flective of diminished culpability. Recognizing this, the insanity defense enables 
courts to send mentally insane criminals to psychiatric institutions.271 
But opponents of the insanity defense maintain that the defense gives crimi-
nals a “get out of jail free” card.272 However, this viewpoint fails to acknowledge 
the low number of attempts to excuse crime by proving mental insanity in states 
that do have the insanity defense.273 In fact, the insanity defense is attempted in less 
than 1% of felony cases.274 And even when a defendant pleads the insanity defense, 
success is a long shot due to strict insanity defense standards.275 When a defendant 
is acquitted under the insanity defense, according to the most recent available data, 
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85% of the time such defendant is immediately committed to a mental hospital.276 
The remaining 14% of acquitted defendants are subject to conditional release and 
outpatient treatment.277 Thus, only 1% of acquitted defendants are actually released 
into society without restrictions. Further, to compare a mental hospital commitment 
to a “get out of jail free” card is to disregard the nature of mental hospitals—they 
are not country clubs but instead, they are heavily secured institutions full of sick 
patients. Thus, acquittals under the insanity defense are not “ticket[s] to free-
dom.”278 
Even still, defendants attempt to plea insanity in states that do not even have 
the insanity defense.279 But without an insanity defense in place to regulate insanity 
pleas, courts lack guidance on handling mentally insane defendants. An insanity 
defense would assist courts in weeding out frivolous insanity pleas. It would pro-
vide courts with strict requirements a defendant must meet to be acquitted under the 
insanity defense,280 and would, in turn, deter defendants from pleading insanity 
unless they thought they met the required standard. 
In sum, while the insanity defense does not necessarily promote retribution in 
the sense that the punishment should fit the crime, it also does not completely fail 
to hold mentally insane criminals accountable. The insanity defense does not “let 
off” criminals. Rather, it gives mentally insane criminals what they truly deserve—
adequate treatment in a secured facility. 
C. Deterrence 
Next, the deterrence theory aims to punish in order to discourage the individ-
ual offender from committing the crime again and to discourage other potential 
offenders from committing the crime.281 The ultimate goal of deterrence is to pre-
vent future crimes.282 But mentally insane criminals, through punishment, are not 
deterred from committing future crimes.283 Individuals are only deterred if they 
“view the lessons” that punishment attempts to teach.284 But insane people, both 
criminals and non-criminals, are unlikely to learn the lessons of what happens when 
an offense is committed if such individuals are incapable of even understanding the 
nature and consequences of their own criminal actions.285 Indeed, 
[i]f the purpose of the law is not only to inflict punishment for the com-
mission of prohibited acts, but to set examples which will restrain others 
from doing like acts, it is manifest that the punishment of the insane will 
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not prohibit or deter another insane person from doing another similar act; 
it can have no effect upon another insane person . . . .286 
Also, sane people would not be deterred from the punishment of mentally insane 
criminals, since sane people cannot identify with mentally insane criminals and 
because the kind of crimes that mentally insane criminals commit are outside the 
normal spectrum of crimes.287 Thus, deterrence fails as a justification for punishing 
mentally insane criminals because they are unlikely to be deterred from committing 
future crimes. 
D. Incapacitation 
Finally, some people believe that mentally insane criminals, and criminals in 
general, should be incarcerated for the duration of their lives because they pose a 
danger to their communities.288 Such a belief is based upon the final goal of pun-
ishment, incapacitation.289 Under the theory of incapacitation, criminals should be 
punished in order to keep them separate from society so that they no longer pose a 
danger to their communities.290 Prison sentences indeed incapacitate mentally in-
sane criminals. However, psychiatric institutions also incapacitate such individuals. 
But psychiatric institutions do not release mentally insane criminals until they 
demonstrate they are no longer a threat to society, which is primarily accomplished 
through rehabilitation.291 Prisons release mentally insane criminals when their sen-
tences are up, whether or not they still pose a threat to society.292 Prisons may, in 
fact, worsen a mentally insane criminal’s condition because prison conditions can 
be counter-therapeutic.293 Consequently, prisons may release individuals back into 
society in an even more dangerous state than when they entered prison.294 Indeed, 
once mentally insane individuals are incarcerated, it becomes a “tough cycle to 
break.”295 For if mentally insane criminals are not adequately treated, their chances 
of recidivism significantly increase and their mental conditions likely worsen.296 
Even courts have taken notice of how ill-suited prisons are for the mentally ill, 
opining that it is 
deplorable and outrageous that [prisons] appear to have become a reposi-
tory for a great number [of] mentally ill citizens. Persons who with psy-
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chiatric care could fit will into society, are instead locked away, to become 
wards of the state’s penal system. Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they 
may be confined in conditions that nurture, rather than abate, their psycho-
ses.297 
Thus, incapacitation as a justification for not having an insanity defense fails be-
cause mentally insane criminals would be incapacitated in a psychiatric institution, 
where they could potentially be kept longer than in prison and where they would be 
adequately rehabilitated. 
In sum, the abolition of the insanity defense does not promote rehabilitation, 
retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. Rather, rehabilitation would be best 
served through the insanity defense, and the lack thereof most harms this goal of 
punishment. The insanity defense would also advance retribution and incapacita-
tion. Deterrence may simply not be accomplished through punishing or treating 
mentally insane criminals, and thus fails to justify the abolition of the insanity de-
fense. Therefore, in order to best promote the goals of punishment, Idaho should 
adopt the insanity defense. 
V. THE 2-PART MENS REA TEST 
State legislatures and courts, including those in Idaho, have ignored an essen-
tial component of mens rea—moral blameworthiness.298 Moral blameworthiness 
requires that the defendant have acted with a “free, voluntary, and rational choice to 
do evil.”299 However, those who support the abolition of the insanity defense have 
interpreted mens rea as pertaining only to intent, specifically, the mental element of 
the charged offense.300 History indicates, however, that mens rea is composed of 
both elements, criminal intent and moral blameworthiness.301 
The dual nature of mens rea can be traced back to ancient history.302 St. Au-
gustine, around 600 AD, likely coined the term “mens rea” in his writings.303 The 
dual nature of mens rea was first introduced in the thirteenth century.304 During that 
time, Henry Bracton, a judge who influenced common law, wrote, “[W]e must con-
sider with what mind . . . or with what intent . . . a thing is done . . . . For take away 
the will and every act will be indifferent, because your state of mind gives meaning 
to your act, and a crime is not committed unless the intent to injure . . . intervene . . 
. .”305 To summarize, while the “with what intent” component speaks to the mental 
element of the charged offense, the “with what mind” component speaks to moral 
blameworthiness. 306 “With what mind” asks whether the defendant either acted 
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with a morally blameworthy state of mind, so as to make him culpable, or failed to 
recognize or appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, so as to make him inculpa-
ble.307 The early courts adopted the duality of mens rea when they chose to exam-
ine both intent and moral blameworthiness.308 And in the fourteenth century, courts 
began to use the absence of moral blameworthiness and criminal intent as a com-
plete defense to crimes.309 
Perhaps more importantly, the dual nature of mens rea is also rooted in Eng-
lish common law, which has guided American law in determining fundamental 
principles of law.310 In 1765, Sir William Blackstone wrote the Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, a treatise on English common law that has heavily influenced 
American law.311 In the treatise, Blackstone wrote, “to constitute a crime against 
human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act con-
sequent upon such vicious will.”312 By requiring a vicious will, English common 
law embraced the moral blameworthiness component of mens rea.313 In addition, 
the insanity defense test in M’Naghten, as discussed in Part II, required that a de-
fendant must either not have known the “nature and quality of what he was doing” 
or, if he knew the nature and quality of what he was doing, “he did not know that 
[what] he was doing was wrong.”314 The test, which inquired into whether a de-
fendant could choose between right and wrong, sought to determine criminal re-
sponsibility based on moral blameworthiness.315 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the duality of mens rea.316 Explaining that criminal responsibility goes 
beyond a specific intent to act, the Court noted, 
One who [acts] cannot be said to be actuated by malice aforethought, or to 
have deliberately [acted], or to have ‘a wicked, depraved, and malignant 
heart,’ or a heart ‘regardless of society duty and fatally bent on mischief,’ 
unless at the time he had sufficient mind to comprehend the criminality or 
the right and wrong of such an act.”317 
Essentially, the Court emphasized the importance of focusing not solely on intent, 
but also on moral blameworthiness—whether the defendant comprehended the 
right or wrong nature of his act.318 Going back to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Delling 
v. Idaho,319 under the dual nature of mens rea, the second defendant, who killed a 
human because he believed a wolf ordered him to kill, would not be held criminally 
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responsible.320 Instead, because he lacked the ability to understand and appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his murder, the second defendant, along with the first defend-
ant, would escape criminal culpability and instead be sent to a psychiatric institu-
tion.321 
However, over time, courts and legislatures narrowed the concept of mens rea 
to solely address intent and consequently disregarded moral blameworthiness alto-
gether.322 Rather than acknowledge the dual nature of mens rea, and as a result of 
confusion over the proper and historical two-fold nature of mens rea, some states 
have collapsed the two components into a single concept that strictly refers to the 
mental element (intent) of the charged offense.323 Indeed, in the four states that lack 
the insanity defense, a mens rea doctrine exists, but the doctrine speaks only to in-
tent.324 Moral blameworthiness is not given weight in any of those states. In effect, 
the historic and fundamental principle of criminal law that mentally insane defend-
ants are not morally blameworthy, and thus should not be held criminally responsi-
ble, has been abandoned in those states. 
And yet, the failure to incorporate both aspects of mens rea is a violation of 
the Due Process Clause.325 A statute or some other kind of state action infringes 
due process rights if it “offends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”326 Given that the 
dual nature of mens rea is rooted in both common law and ancient history, it is in-
deed a fundamental principle of justice.327 Therefore, the insanity defense is pro-
tected by due process. While the Idaho Supreme Court in Searcy recognized that 
the insanity defense has “a long and varied history during its development in the 
common law,” the court found that due to its lack of uniformity, the insanity de-
fense is not so deeply rooted in American legal history.328 But what the court fails 
to appreciate is that while the insanity defense has taken many forms throughout 
English common law and American history, every jurisdiction in England and the 
United States, at some point, has adopted a variation of the insanity defense,329 thus 
recognizing it as an essential defense and fundamental principle of criminal law. 
While some states have since abolished the insanity defense, there is a modern 
trend to again adopt the insanity defense and rule the ban on the insanity defense 
unconstitutional.330  Indeed, even today all but four states have the insanity de-
fense.331 As such, Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense is unconstitutional be-
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cause it violates due process. In order to comply with the Due Process Clause, Ida-
ho should again adopt an insanity defense. 
VI. THE INSANITY DEFENSE WOULD SAVE IDAHO MONEY 
Constitutional issues aside, adopting the insanity defense would serve Idaho’s 
financial interests in the long run.332 While the annual costs of housing and treating 
a mentally insane patient in a state hospital are more than housing and treating a 
mentally insane inmate in prison, effective rehabilitation in a state hospital would 
ultimately save money.333 And because the money that goes into the prison system 
comes from tax dollars, all of society is invested in the issue of imprisoning mental-
ly insane criminals.334 
In 2013, according to the Idaho Department of Correction, the average cost to 
house a prisoner in Idaho, per day, was $55.50.335 Per year, this averages out to 
approximately $20,250 per prisoner. On the other hand, state hospitals cost approx-
imately $90,000-$100,000 per year to house a patient.336 Thus, while looking solely 
at the surface of these figures, some states have been economically incentivized to 
send mentally insane criminals to prisons rather than state mental hospitals.337 
But prisons spend more money on housing and treating mentally insane pris-
oners than other prisoners.338 In 2013, about 33% of the prison population in the 
Idaho Department of Correction consisted of prisoners with mental health needs.339 
The numbers are up since 2012, when 27% of the prison population had mental 
health needs.340 That year, almost half of the 27% of prisoners with mental health 
needs needed special housing or treatment.341 Special housing or treatment adds 
extra costs to prisons.342 In Idaho, the cost per-inmate to treat mental health needs 
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rose to approximately $4,188 in 2012.343 If that number did not change much in 
2013, the total cost to house and treat such inmates adds up to around $24,500 
when factoring in both mental health services and regular bed costs. But the costs 
may be bigger now or may continue to grow. Indeed, the average cost for treating 
and housing seriously mentally ill prisoners in America is approximately $35,000 
per person a year.344  And, as explained in Part IV.D., defendants may end up 
spending more time in prison than a mental hospital, where they may be released 
when they are proven to no longer be a threat to themselves and their community, 
whereas in prisons they are required to serve their entire sentence.345 Thus, it is 
more expensive to incarcerate a mentally ill prisoner than other prisoners.346 
But is it more expensive to place mentally insane defendants in mental hospi-
tals, as opposed to prisons? As the numbers demonstrate, per year, yes.347 As previ-
ously noted, state hospitals across America, on average, cost about $90,000-
$100,000 to house patients.348 But, as illustrated in Part IV.A., mental hospital pa-
tients receive better treatment and are more effectively rehabilitated than prison 
inmates. And when inmates are effectively treated and rehabilitated, once they are 
released back into their communities, they are less likely to commit more crimes.349 
Less crime in society saves money.350 And, also illustrated in Part IV.D., state hos-
pitals may not hold onto patients as long as prisons would hold onto them, depend-
ing on when the patients can demonstrate they are no longer a threat to themselves 
and their communities. Indeed, when patients are better rehabilitated and treated, 
they are released into society sooner and their recidivism rates are lower.351 Thus, 
with lower recidivism rates, fewer offenders enter back into the expensive prison 
system.352 
Further, an insanity defense would preclude mentally insane murderers from 
going through the expensive process of capital litigation. Idaho is one of thirty-two 
states that administers the death penalty.353 Due to the cost of state-paid lawyers, 
appeals, hearings, and other legal fees, death penalty cases are more expensive than 
any other kind of litigation, especially because a life is at stake.354 And death penal-
ty cases last many years, with the average case lasting twenty-one years just be-
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tween sentencing and execution. 355  In fact, in Idaho, one inmate, Gene Stuart, 
joined death row in 1982 – thirty-two years ago.356 
The combination of various legal fees with the long life span of death penalty 
cases leads to shocking costs – approximately $2 million for each death penalty 
case in America.357 In Idaho, taxpayers spend millions of dollars towards capital 
litigation.358 But if mentally insane murderers were committed to mental institu-
tions rather than thrown on death row, ultimately taxpayers would avoid funding 
expensive executions and the drawn-out legal process that comes with them.359 
Currently, some of the current death row inmates are mentally ill.360 For instance, 
the Chief Psychologist at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution determined that 
inmate Timothy Dunlap has a “psychiatric illness requiring treatment.”361 The psy-
chologist further determined that Dunlap needs to be housed in the mental health 
unit due to his mental illness.362 In addition to Dunlap, death row inmate David 
Card is mentally insane.363 Specifically, he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.364 
Card has been on death row since 1989, and Dunlap since 1992.365 But the insanity 
defense would have likely sent these two inmates to a mental institution, rather than 
to death row.366 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Mentally insane criminals in Idaho have little hope of rehabilitation and be-
coming law-abiding members of their communities without an insanity defense in 
place. Instead, these criminals are sent to prison where their mental conditions like-
ly worsen. And if they are released back into society, their exacerbated mental con-
ditions increase their likelihood of ending back up in prison, costing the state more 
money and failing to reduce crime rates.367 
But Idaho can solve such problems by again adopting an insanity defense that 
incorporates the dual nature of mens rea, intent and moral blameworthiness. 
Through doing so, Idaho would ensure that those who are precluded from criminal 
responsibility, such as mentally insane defendants who lack both intent and the 
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ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their crimes, are not punished. And 
through recognizing the dual nature of mens rea, Idaho would promote fundamental 
principles of criminal law and, in turn, enforce due process of the law. 
Even more, adopting the insanity defense would advance the goals of pun-
ishment. By adequately treating mentally insane criminals, the insanity defense 
would promote rehabilitation. In John Cope’s case, the man who believed God 
commanded him to kill “the mark of the beast,”368 the trial judge could have com-
mitted Cope to a state mental hospital to effectively treat his severe mental condi-
tions. Instead, with no insanity defense statute in place, the trial judge had no 
choice but to sentence Cope to prison. Additionally, by giving mentally insane 
criminals what they truly deserve—treatment in a secure location—an insanity de-
fense in Idaho would promote retribution. While Cope committed a heinous crime, 
his crime was a product of religious delusions. Cope does not deserve to be locked 
behind prison bars and subjected to prison conditions, which would ultimately 
worsen his mental conditions. Rather, Cope deserves to be committed to a hospital 
that will treat his conditions, help him cope with his delusions, and steer him away 
from future criminal conduct. But instead, Idaho’s only intention with Cope is to 
keep him in prison until he dies. 
Also, by keeping mentally insane criminals off the streets until they are no 
longer a threat to themselves and their communities, the insanity defense in Idaho 
would promote incapacitation. While Cope is behind bars, the state of Idaho is pay-
ing hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep him there for the duration of his life. 
And yet, Cope’s mental conditions are likely deteriorating even more than when the 
state first sentenced him to prison. But if Cope were sent to a mental institution, 
Cope would still be isolated from his community in a secured facility. Lastly, while 
the insanity defense does not necessarily promote deterrence, deterrence fails to 
justify a ban on the insanity defense. If a paranoid schizophrenic learned of Cope’s 
punishment, but suffered from similar religious delusions, he would not be deterred 
from committing violent crime because his mental conditions would prevent ra-
tional thought from reminding him of the punishment he would get from commit-
ting the crime. 
Cope’s similarities to Robert Serravo, the mentally insane man who attempted 
to murder his wife in order to carry out his mission from God, suggest that the two 
men would be similarly treated by the justice system. Both men committed crimes 
motivated by religious delusions. Both men recognized the criminality of their con-
duct, but failed to appreciate the nature and quality of their crimes because they 
were blinded by mental insanity. Yet Serravo was rehabilitated in a mental hospital, 
while Cope was punished in prison. These inconsistent outcomes are due to Idaho’s 
ban on the insanity defense. But to better promote justice and advance the goals of 
punishment, to implement due process guarantees, to save Idaho money, and to 
recognize the historical, dual-nature of mens rea, Idaho should again adopt the in-
sanity defense and declare its current ban on the insanity defense unconstitutional. 
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